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In recent years several studies have
documented a near-universal tendency
to vicariously represent the actions and
sensations of others (e.g., see Keysers and
Gazzola, 2009 for review). For example,
observing another person experiencing
pain activates neural regions involved in
experiencing pain (e.g., Singer et al., 2004;
Avenanti et al., 2005) or observing some-
body being touched recruits regions of the
somatosensory cortex involved in expe-
riencing touch (e.g., Keysers et al., 2004,
2010; Ebisch et al., 2008; Schaefer et al.,
2012). For most of us, these vicarious
representations are implicit and do not
lead to overt sensations of the observed
events (e.g., we do not feel pain when
observing pain to others). There are, how-
ever, a small number of individuals who
do experience overt somatic sensations
when observing others’ tactile experi-
ences (Ward et al., 2008; Osborn and
Derbyshire, 2010; Fitzgibbon et al., 2012;
Banissy, 2013). For example, in mirror-
touch synesthesia observing touch or
pain to others evokes a conscious tactile
sensation on the synesthetes’ own body
(Banissy and Ward, 2007; Holle et al.,
2011). This opinion piece seeks to dis-
cuss potential neural mechanisms that
contribute to the developmental form of
mirror-touch synesthesia (for descriptions
of acquired forms of mirror-touch/pain
synesthesia see Fitzgibbon et al., 2012;
Goller et al., 2013), and the important
role that self-other representations may
have on vicarious experiences of touch in
mirror-touch synesthesia.
Approximately 1.6% of individuals
experience developmental mirror-touch
synesthesia and there are at least two
spatial subtypes (Banissy et al., 2009; also
seeWhite and Aimola Davies, 2012). In the
more common subtype, the synesthetic
experience is evoked as though looking in
a mirror (i.e., observing touch to the left
side of the face evokes tactile sensations on
the right side of the synesthete’s face). In
the less common, anatomical subtype, the
synesthetic experience is mapped anatom-
ically (i.e., observing touch the left side of
the face evokes tactile sensations on the
left side of the synesthete’s face)1. For each
subtype, their experiences are reported to
be automatic, enduring, and present since
childhood (Banissy and Ward, 2007; Holle
et al., 2011).
While several studies have examined
cognitive and perceptual characteris-
tics of mirror-touch synesthesia (e.g.,
Banissy and Ward, 2007; Banissy et al.,
2009, 2011; Holle et al., 2011; White and
Aimola Davies, 2012; Aimola-Davies and
White, 2013), there has been relatively
less research that delineates the neural
mechanisms that contribute to devel-
opmental mirror-touch. One common
suggestion is that developmental mirror-
touch synesthesia may be a function of
atypical cortical excitability within neural
regions supporting normal somatosen-
sory mirroring. That is, brain regions
that are generally recruited when observ-
ing touch to others are over excitable
in mirror-touch synesthesia leading to
observed touch evoking overt tactile
1These two spatial frames of reference are consistent
with neurophysiological findings in primates docu-
menting anatomical and mirrored spatial frames of
reference that mediate bimodal visual-tactile cells in
the macaque parietal cortex. These cells respond when
the monkey is touched and when the monkey observes
touch to the same body part of someone else (Ishida
et al., 2009).
sensations. For example, Blakemore and
colleagues (2005) reported the first case
of developmental mirror-touch synesthe-
sia in a functional neuroimaging study
where they compared neural activity in a
single mirror-touch synesthete (“C”) to a
group of control participants. Using fMRI
Blakemore and colleagues investigated the
neural systems underlying C’s synesthetic
experience by contrasting brain activity
when watching videos of humans relative
to objects being touched (the latter did not
evoke synesthesia) in “C” and in 12 non-
synesthetic control subjects. In controls,
a network of regions was recruited dur-
ing the observation of touch to a human
relative to an object (including primary
and secondary somatosensory cortex, pre-
motor regions, and the superior temporal
sulcus). Similar brain regions were also
activated during actual touch, indicating
that observing touch to another person
activates a similar neural circuit as actual
tactile experience—the mirror-touch sys-
tem. “C” recruited a similar network of
regions, but showed hyperactivity in many
of these regions (including the primary
and secondary somatosensory cortices).
This hyper-activity was interpreted as the
neural correlate of C’s synesthesia, with
the suggestion that C’s overt experiences
of touch when observing touch to others
may be a function of hyper-excitability of
normal somatosensory mirroring mecha-
nisms (Blakemore et al., 2005).
While hyper-excitability of somatosen-
sory mirroring mechanisms may be a
correlate of mirror-touch synesthesia, pre-
cisely what contributes to mirror-touch
synesthetes showing increased cortical
excitability within the mirror-touch sys-
tem when observing touch to others is
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somewhat elusive. It is not the case that
the somatosensory system is hyper-excited
in some global (i.e., context-free) sense.
For instance, in a recent group fMRI study
(Holle et al., under revision) there was
evidence of hypo-excitability (in mirror-
touch synesthetes relative to the con-
trol group) within somatosensory regions
when observing touch to dummy faces.
The latter stimuli do not tend to elicit
synesthetic touch. As such the activity
within the somatosensory network seems
to be differently modulated (or gated) in
synesthetes relative to controls.
In controls, behavioral evidence from
an interference paradigm involving real
touch (to one’s own face) and the sight
of touch (to an observed face) shows
that visuo-tactile interference is greatest
when self-other similarity is greater; for
instance, in terms of visual appearance or
even political opinions (e.g., Serino et al.,
2008, 2009). One plausible suggestion is
that faulty self-other monitoring mecha-
nisms may lead to a disinhibition of nor-
mal somatosensory mirror mechanisms
in individuals with mirror-touch synes-
thesia (Banissy et al., 2009; Fitzgibbon
et al., 2012). In line with this, recent
findings indicate that observing touch to
others not only evokes overt tactile sen-
sations in mirror-touch synesthetes, but
also elicits changes in mental representa-
tions of the self (Maister et al., 2013). In
that study the “enfacement illusion” was
used to examine self-representations in
developmental mirror-touch synesthesia.
In the typical enfacement illusion partici-
pants are shown a series of images of mor-
phed faces containing varying proportions
of the participants face or an unfamiliar
other, and are asked to indicate the extent
to which the face looks like the self. They
then view a video in which another person
is being touched that is in synchrony and
congruent with felt touch that is delivered
to the participants face. This synchronous
mapping between observed and felt touch
leads participants to report an increase
in perceived similarity between the other
and themselves. That is to say that after
experiencing synchrony between observed
and felt touch, the images that partici-
pants had initially perceived as containing
equal quantities of self and other became
more likely to be recognized as the self
(i.e., they show a self-other blurring where
they begin to incorporate more of the
other into representations of themselves—
Tsakiris, 2008; Tajadura-Jimenez et al.,
2012). For mirror-touch synesthetes, this
self-other blurring was shown to occur in
the absence of felt touch being applied
to their own face, implying that sim-
ply viewing touch to others evokes a
change in self-representations in mirror-
touch synesthesia (Maister et al., 2013).
Potential candidate neural regions that
may mediate a relationship between self-
other processing and neural activity in the
mirror-touch system include the inferior
parietal lobule, temproparietal junction
(TPJ), and anterior insula (see Northoff
et al., 2011 for review of brain areas
involved in representing and distinguish
self from other). In the context of mirror-
touch synesthesia, regions of particular
note are the anterior insula and TPJ.
In the functional neuroimaging study by
Blakemore et al. (2005) the only brain
region that was shown to distinguish
between synesthete “C’ and the control
group was neural activity in the ante-
rior insula. The anterior insula has been
linked to self-other processing in sev-
eral domains, including self-face recog-
nition (e.g., Devue et al., 2007), body
ownership (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2007),
and perspective taking (e.g., Ruby and
Decety, 2001). It is also known to have
structural connections with neural regions
involved in the mirror-touch system,
including the secondary somatosensory
cortex (Mesulam and Mufson, 1985): in
this context it is notable that although our
recent neuroimaging study of a group of
mirror-touch synesthetes did not observe
functional differences in the anterior
insula (Holle et al., under revision), we did
see cortical excitability differences local-
ized to the secondary somatosensory cor-
tex, which may be mediated by functional
connectivity with the anterior insula.
A further candidate that may con-
tribute to atypical self-other processing
in mirror-touch synesthesia is the TPJ.
The TPJ is also commonly linked to self-
other representations, including agency
discrimination (e.g., Farrer and Frith,
2002), perspective taking (e.g., Aichhorn
et al., 2006), empathy (e.g., Völlm et al.,
2006), and the online control of repre-
sentations between self and other (e.g.,
Santiesteban et al., 2012). Recent findings
indicate that mirror-touch synesthetes
show structural brain differences relative
to controls within the right TPJ (namely,
reduced gray matter volume; Holle et al.,
under revision), suggesting broader cor-
tical difference in mirror-touch synesthe-
sia beyond regions involved in vicarious
somatosensory mirroring. This area may
therefore also contribute to atypical self-
other processing in mirror-touch synes-
thesia (e.g., Aimola-Davies and White,
2013; Maister et al., 2013), which in turn
may modulate somatosensory mirroring
in mirror-touch synesthesia.
In a broader context, it is also inter-
esting to consider the extent to which
differences in cortical mechanisms related
to self-other processing may contribute to
broader traits observed in developmen-
tal mirror-touch synesthesia. For example,
we have previously reported that devel-
opmental mirror-touch synesthetes show
heightened levels of emotional empathy
relative to controls (Banissy and Ward,
2007), and it is fairly clear to see how
a blurring between the self and other
may be useful in facilitating this capac-
ity. However, one may also ask whether
there may be circumstances where atypi-
cal self-other monitoring may lead to less
beneficial consequences. One prediction
may be that developmental mirror-touch
synesthetes will show reductions in capac-
ities that are dependent on their ability
to engage online control of the represen-
tations of the self or other (e.g., agency
discrimination). This remains to be deter-
mined with future studies. What is clearer,
however, is that it would seem unlikely that
alterations in self-other processing would
lead solely to mirror-touch synesthesia;
rather one would expect that mirror-touch
synesthesia may be one of a constellation
of traits associated with atypical mecha-
nisms of self-other representation.
In sum, individuals with mirror-touch
synesthesia experience tactile sensations
on their own body when simply observ-
ing touch to others. While the majority
of explanations related to this condi-
tion have focused around hyper-active
somatosensory mirroring, relatively less
has focused on the important role that self-
other processing may play in modulating
somatosensory mirroring mechanisms.
Despite this, there is growing evidence to
suggest atypical self-other representations
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in mirror-touch synesthesia and further
work is needed to determine the relation-
ship between neural regions involved in
self-other processing and the mirror-touch
system, in both mirror-touch synesthesia
and typical adults.
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